The Great Raid(2005) !!HOT!!

From a technical and a visceral standpoint, the actual raid, which encapsulates the movie's final third, is an accomplished extended sequence. It's well paced, nicely photographed, and exciting enough to keep viewers engaged. The problem is that getting to this point can be a chore. This is an odd quality to find in a John Dahl film. Dahl, primarily a director of thrillers (Joy Ride, The Last Seduction), is known for his economy of scenes and expert pacing. Something went wrong here, and the result is a muddled movie that has a solid climax but a poor build-up. In the end, it can be said that The Great Raid tells a great story, but the telling is not as good as the story deserves.

The Great Raid(2005)

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This word today about the JAPS sounds very cruel and offensive to the Japanese people, but during the War Years during WW II in the Pacific this word was used in most American Newspapers and spoken about during this horrible war with a nation that killed and raped many people in Nanking, China. In this film many of U.S. Service Men are trapped in a Japanese Concentration Camp who inflicted horrible tortures and slaughter hundreds of American Soldiers and women who are treated worse than animals. America makes every effort to find these lost prisoners of war and is horrified how the Japanese soldiers treated our people and make a great effort to free all these prisoners. However, it took many men and women lives in order to accomplish this mission. This is a great picture which still remembers all the men and women who gave their lives to fight back at the mistreatment of American soldiers. GREAT FILM.

In the notorious POW camp at Cabanatuan in occupied Philippines, the Japanese hold about 500 American prisoners who had survived the Bataan Death March. The Japanese are getting orders to liquidate the prisoners. Over the course of 5 days starting at Jan 27, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Mucci and Captain Prince (James Franco) lead the 6th Ranger Battalion along with the Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas to liberate the prison camp some 30 miles behind enemy lines. The movie switches back and forth between the rescue, people like Margaret Utinsky (Connie Nielsen) who is a nurse in occupied Manila, and the prison camp where men led by Major Gibson (Joseph Fiennes) suffer under Japanese brutality.It's an old fashion traditional war movie. It does stray into melodrama from time to time. It's also scattered among the various character sideplots. The scale of production is just below epic. There are a lot of good actors at work. However that does make me question why Benjamin Bratt is cast as the soldier in charge of the rescue. That seems to be the more important role and a more established actor like Fiennes should be doing it. This would work better if the movie picks between a prison movie or a rescue movie and put Fiennes in the lead of either. The final rescue action is done well and the movie is generally good but not great.

U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began on October7, 2001, and continue today. The military component is just one aspect in this endeavor, which alsoinvolves diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts to defeat terrorists aroundthe world. This report focuses on U.S. military operations in four areas -- Afghanistan, Africa, thePhilippines, and Colombia -- although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activitiesin other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the Administration. Whilesome consider military operations in Iraq as part of this war, many do not, and because of thecomplexity of this issue, Iraq is treated separately and in greater detail in other CRS reports.(2)

Current Situation. The Italian Rapid DeploymentCorps will command ISAF until May 2006 and then relinquish command to the British-ledmulti-national Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which will command ISAFfor nine months.(45) InFebruary 2005, NATO agreed to expand ISAF coverage into southern Afghanistan, providingsecurity assistance to an estimated 50 percent of Afghanistan.(46) On September 28, theGerman Parliament voted in favor of extending Germany's mandate in Afghanistan until October2006 and will expand its forces assigned to ISAF from 2,250 to 3,000 troops.(47) France reportedlyannounced on December 18 that it would send an additional 450 troops by mid-2006 to support the600 French troops that are currently part of ISAF.(48) France also has about 200 special forces troops deployed insouthern Afghanistan.(49)Despite these commitments of additional troops, there continues to be a great deal of concernamongst certain U.S. allies about ISAF working more closely with the U.S. counterterrorism effortin Afghanistan. France, Germany, and Spain do not want ISAF leadership to also take overleadership of counterterror operations - a position supported by the United States and GreatBritain.(50) Reportedly,discussions were underway to find a way whereby France and Germany would permit NATO tocommand both ISAF and counterterror operations but not participate directly in theseoperations.(51)

While NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated that "NATO is committed forthe long term" in Afghanistan(64) some believe that a substantial U.S. military presence will berequired throughout the duration of the NATO-led mission to insure long-term NATO commitment.There are no treaty requirements for NATO members to contribute troops to Afghanistan and NATOhas had difficulties in the past trying to muster sufficient troops and military resources for operationsusing this "pass the hat" approach. Some question how effective NATO will be in its new role, particularly when many of its members are unwilling to place their troops in potentially hostilesituations and only a few member nations are willing to commit their forces to counterterror andcounterinsurgency operations. If only a few NATO's 26 members are willing to engage incounterterror and counterinsurgency operations, then NATO's ability to sustain these operations overan extended period -- against an insurgency that has shown a great deal of resiliency and has shownno signs relenting their attacks against coalition forces -- could be called into question.

One senior U.S. defense official, acknowledging the record of success of PRTs, suggests thatPRTs operate in a "muddled" fashion which has prevented them from having a much greater effecton Afghanistan's future.(67) He attributes this lack of efficacy to four basic factors:inconsistent mission statements; unclear roles and responsibilities; ad hoc preparation; and -- mostimportantly -- limited resources both human, equipment and financial.(68) In order for PRTs toachieve their full potential the Defense official suggests the following improvements:

Afghanistan's opium industry is estimated to employ directly or indirectly anywhere between20 to 30 percent of the Afghan population and provides for almost 60 percent of Afghanistan's grossdomestic product (GDP).(86) The cultivation of poppies -- used in making opium for heroin-- which was regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished after the elimination of the Talibanregime.(87) Accordingto a United Nations (U.N.) report, Afghanistan's poppy harvest rose by 64 percent in 2004 -- makingAfghanistan the world's leading source for opium and heroin.(88) In August 2005, the U.N.reported that opium production had decreased by 21 percent from its 2004 level but, even with thisdecrease, Afghanistan still ranks as the world's largest opium supplier, accounting for 87 percent ofthe world's supply, according to the U.N.(89) There is reportedly evidence that the Taliban are orderingincreased poppy production from Afghan farmers in remote regions beyond the government's controlas a means to make money to finance their operations and also to weaken the Afghan centralgovernment.(90) NATO'sSupreme Commander, U.S. Marine General James L. Jones, has reportedly stated that drugs are agreater threat to Afghan security than a resurgent Taliban.(91)

Some suggest that U.S. involvement in the Philippines is part of a greater U.S. strategy tocombat Islamic terrorism throughout Southeast Asia.(128) Some U.S. officials reportedly believe that Abu Sayyaf andthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front have established connections with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al Qaedaaffiliate operating across Indonesia and the Philippines, who are believed to be responsible for astring of bombings including Bali in 2002 and the Davao bombings in 2003.(129) A May 2005 reportsuggests that Abu Sayyaf has developed a "training relationship and operational alliance" withJemaah Islamiyah that could lead to new capabilities for Abu Sayyaf.(130) While some note therelative success of joint U.S.-Filipino training exercises in combating Abu Sayyaf, others warn thatincreasing U.S. involvement could "complicate" the Philippine's insurgency dilemma and alsopossibly fuel anti-American sentiment in the region, which could form the basis "of a newpan-Islamic solidarity in the region."(131) Some experts contend that not all militant Muslim groupsoperating in Southeast Asia are aligned with Al Qaeda, and it is important that U.S. counterterrorefforts in the region "do not motivate these potential affiliates to join the Al Qaeda cause."(132)

It is possible that Congress may explore in greater detail how Africa not only fits into theAdministration's long term strategy for the war on terror but also what the Administration's specificstrategy is for Africa, if such a strategy exists. While Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa(CJTF-HOA) has been in existence for almost three years, little is publicly known about theselong-term commitments to the region in terms of overall strategy and what resources -- both militaryand financial -- would be required to implement such a strategy, particularly if the Administrationintends to expand operations to other African nations. 041b061a72